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Corporations—Attorney-Client Privilege—Nonavailability of the Privi-
lege to Corporations.—Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n. 1—
During the course of discovery proceedings in a federal district court, counsel
for plaintiff moved to inspect certain documents submitted by a New York
law firm to the counsel of record for American Gas Association (AGA).
A claim of the attorney-client privilege was urged for certain documents on
grounds that information contained therein was obtained by the New York
firm in its capacity as counsel for AGA. At a pre-trial hearing held on April
27th, it was ruled that certain documents qualified for the privilege and that
those not within the privilege were to be handed over to counsel for plain-
tiff. A second group of documents was to be ruled on after further con-
sideration of their contents. In a memorandum opinion the court reversed
its earlier pre-trial ruling. HELD: A corporation is not entitled to claim
the attorney-client privilege. The court also ruled: (1) The documents
excluded earlier due to an improper application of the privilege were ex-
cludable under the attorney's "work-product" privilege; (2) those documents
which were to be studied further did not qualify for the "work-product"
privilege. 2 A supplemental opinion was issued which reaffirmed the court's
earlier rulings. 3 The court restated as its reasons that (a) the courts have
heretofore assumed the privilege applies to corporations; (b) secrecy which
is so essential to the existence of the privilege is impossible in a corporation;
and (c) the privilege is analogous to the privilege against self-incrimination
which is fundamentally personal in nature.4
The attorney-client privilege, which has its roots in early common law,°
has long-standing recognition and approval despite the fact that it excludes
relevant evidence often materially important to the outcome of legal pro-
ceedings. The privilege is based on the public policy that effective legal ad-
vice can be rendered by an attorney only if predicated on the fullest dis-
closure of all relevant and material facts by the client to his attorney. It
is felt that a party will be more responsive and cooperative in divulging such
information if assured that the law will treat as privileged those communica-
tions made in confidence to his counsel. Consequently, the privilege is
widely upheld on the theory that it serves to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice.°
I 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
2 Id. at 776.
3 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
4 Despite his ruling, Judge Campbell remarked:
. . . due to the large and complex nature of modern corporate business trans-
actions corporations should in fact be entitled to the attorney-client privilege.
However, I am not a Court of sufficient importance or authority to create
such a privilege by judicial ordination.
Id. at 325.
n S Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Professor Wigmore's defini-
tion is generally regarded as expressive of the common law rule:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal advisor in
his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose made in
confidence by the client are at his instance permanently protected from dis-
closure by himself or by the legal advisor except the protection be waived.
o Id. at § 2291.
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The decision reached in the instant case marks the first time a court has
seen fit to draw a distinction between the individual and corporate clients'
right to assert the attorney-client privilege, although the same policy con-
siderations are involved.' After further research of the problem, Judge
Campbell concluded that the common law privilege was never meant to
apply to corporations. However, considerable support for a contrary con-
clusion can be found.
An important body of case law has upheld a corporation's right to claim
the privilege where the circumstances warrant its application. 8 Furthermore,
thirty-nine states8 have passed statutes codifying the privilege that attaches
to the confidential communications between a client and his attorney. Be-
cause of the application of the privilege to corporations, the legislatures of
these states must have known of this practice, and, therefore, by their
failure to differentiate between an individual and a corporate client, regarded
them as equally entitled to the privilege. Both the Model Code of Evidence,
published in 1942 by the American Law Institute, and the Uniform Rules
of Evidence, drafted in 1953 by the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws,
explicitly recognize a corporation's right to the privilege. 1 °
7 Note, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 235, 241 (1962):
.. it appears that the policy of the privilege gives its full application to
corporate communications, since the group of agents and directors who motivate
a corporation need the incentive of the privilege fully as much as do private
clients to encourage full disclosure to counsel. It is the office of these men
to fear for the well-being of the corporation just as an individual fears for
his own well-being, and absent the privilege, corporate agents would doubtless
be reluctant to disclose facts which might work against the corporation if
disclosed.
8 United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 241 (N.D.N.V. 1960); Georgia-Pac. Plywood
Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); A. B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp, 83, 102
(S.D.N.Y. 1950); Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 Fed, 563
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898); Stewart Equip. Co. v. Gallo, 32 N.J. Super. 15, 107 A.2d 527
(1954); Ex parte Schoepf, 174 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906); Davenport Co. v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 166 Pa. 480, 31 Atl. 245 (1895); Robertson v: Virginia, 181 Va. 520,
25 S.E.2d 352 (1943); Southwark & Vauxhall Water Co. v. Quirk, 3 Q.B.D. 315 (1878).
9 Memorandum for Defendants, p. 13. See generally, 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra
note 5, § 2292, for a partial list of these statutes which are regarded as expressive of
the common law rule.
10 Model Code of Evidence Rule 209 and Uniform Rule of Evidence 26(3) are
identical.
(a) "client" means a person or corporation or other association that, directly
or through an authorized representative, consults a lawyer or the lawyer's
representative for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal service
from him in his professional capacity. . . .
In the Introduction (vii) to the Model Code it is important to note that the authors
stated:
[The Codel . . . is the orderly statement of those basic or specially important
subjects of the general common law susceptible of useful restatement.
In regard to the attorney-client privilege, the authors of the Code indicated that
Rule 209 represented no deviation from existing common law. Thus far, New Jersey
has been the only state to adopt the Uniform Rules of Evidence. See N.J. Stat. Ann.
2A:84A-20(1) (Supp. 1961).
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It should be noted, however, that these cases have not considered the
basic issue here in question, i.e., does the privilege exist at all for the corpo-
ration, but rather have assumed that point and merely decided whether or
not in a given case the communications qualify for the privilege.
But, while the court is correct in pointing out that cases supporting
the privilege are based upon this assumption, one court has explicitly stated
that so many years of assumptions make for a well settled rule, remarking:
I find myself unable to follow Judge Campbell's decision to the
effect that the attorney-client privilege is not available to cor-
porations. His opinion is supported by a good deal of history and
sound logic, but the availability of the privilege to corporations
has gone unchallenged so long and has been so generally accepted
that I must recognize that it does exist."
While no attempt will be made to forecast how the Court of Appeals
might decide the issue, 12 an analysis of some of the more important reasons
assigned by the District Court for reaching its conclusion contained in its
original as well as supplemental opinion is in order. One of the most es-
sential features of the common law rule is confidentiality. The statutes, case
law, treatise writers and commentators are in fundamental agreement that
the communication to be privileged must not only be intended to be con-
fidential but must also be kept confidential." In the case of the individual
client, once the attorney-client relationship has been established, a pre-
sumption of secrecy seems warranted where the communications are not
made in the presence of third parties." The exact opposite presumption was
found by the present court where a corporate client was involved. 15
It is submitted that this conclusion seems unwarranted and that the
"thickness of the corporate. walls" may have been underestimated. The
possibility of disclosure to third persons cannot be controverted. However,
the court seems to be equating mere possible disclosure with actual dis-
closure. Instead of relying on demonstrations of such disclosures which would
destroy the privilege, the court proceeds on a speculative line of reasoning
that there should be a presumption of lack of confidentiality because of
the nature of corporations. In this respect, Judge Campbell was evidently
disturbed by the fact that members of AGA's board of directors and execu-
tive committees served in corporations engaged in various aspects of the
utility industry. Each had extensive business dealings with others and be-
cause of this intimate interlocking relationship, the court was prompted
to conclude that
Information from or in the hands of these individuals would un-
questionably be information from or in the hands of persons outside
11 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
a 70,536 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (attorney-client privilege held not applicable on other grounds).
12 Application for leave to appeal has been filed with the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, but the court has not yet acted on it.
13 Wigmore, op. cit., supra note 5, § 2311.
14 Ibid.
13 207 F. Supp. at 773-75.
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the scope of the term 'client.' ... It is most unrealistic to presume
that such communications are made with the intention of confiden-
tiality or could possibly avoid the 'profanation' so clearly con-
demned by the Rule as created at common law."
However, the court again assumes there have been actual disclosures and
that the communications were not intended to be confidential, without proof
to that effect. Furthermore, the court appears to have assumed a breach
of the fiduciary duty owed by the directors to the corporation.
It has long been recognized that the corporation can only act through
its agents and that comunications remain privileged in instances where the
agent acts as a conduit between the client and the attorney or where the com-
munication originates with the agent himself." It has also been recognized
that the privilege is not waived if the communications are disclosed to other
interested agents," or to those agents who are necessary for its transmittal
to counsel." Therefore, the secrecy of the communications will not be
destroyed where it can be shown that the information was in the hands
of authorized agents of the corporation. 2°
Also, instead of condemning the attorney-client privilege entirely, the
court should have followed the more reasonable approach adopted in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America and Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA.2 '
Rather than engage in wide-sweeping generalizations, the court in each
case preferred to make a detailed analysis of each document to determine
whether it qualified for the privilege. In the Zenith Radio case, it was pointed
out that the privilege "is not a blanket one," and must be decided by "the
special relationship that must be found for each document separately con-
sidered."22 The court in the instant case, therefore, would have been on
firmer ground had it looked to see if there were actual disclosures of the com-
munications.
Another reason assigned for the present ruling was that the attorney-client
privilege is a personal privilege and as in the case of the privilege against
self-incrimination, can only be claimed by a natural person.28 However,
18
 Id, at 774.
17 Stewart Equip. Co. v. Gallo, supra note 8. See 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 5,
§ 2317.
18 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 8, at 253, where the
court stated:
I know of no authority which would hold that the privilege is lost because one
executive in a corporation discloses to another such executive the factual in-
formation which he has given to counsel upon which to base a legal opinion.
19 Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 8.
20 See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 Yale
L.J. 953, 957 (1956), where the author points out that
If the day-to-day legal affairs of corporations are to be carried forward in a
practical fashion, the director or officer should be permitted the privilege for
confidential disclosures bearing on corporate matters within the area of his
responsibility. With respect to directors still in office, it is hornbook Iaw that
they are responsible for the corporation as a whole and should interest them-
selves in all its affairs.
21 Supra note 8.
22 Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, supra note 8.
25 207 F. Supp. at 773, 775.
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denial of the privilege against self-incrimination to a corporation 24 does
not compel a similar conclusion with respect to the attorney-client privi-
lege.25 In United States v. White,26 Mr. Justice Murphy speaking for the
Court stated the underlying reasons behind the privilege against self-
incrimination:
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially
a personal one, applying only to a natural individual. . . . It is de-
signed to prevent the use of legal process to force from the lips of
the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him or to
force him to produce and authenticate any personal documents that
might incriminate him. Physical torture and other less violent but
equally reprehensible modes of compelling the production of in-
criminating evidence are thereby avoided.
It is therefore evident that the acts condemned by this privilege can only
be applied to a natural person. 27 The policy supporting the attorney-client
privilege, on the other hand, is based on the theory that suppression of rele-
vant evidence is outweighed by the need for clients to secure legal advice
without fear that their attorneys will be forced to disclose communications
made in confidence!
In reversing its earlier ruling, the court placed certain documents within
the "work-product" privilege.28 While extended discussion of this ruling is
beyond the scope of this note, it is suggested that this conclusion would
provide no safeguard for the corporate client. The attorney-client privilege
belongs to the client and is absolute unless waived by him. 2D The "work-
product" privilege, on the other hand, belongs to the attorney and may be
defeated by a showing of "good cause."2° In the instant case, the documents
are within the hands of counsel for defendants; and in all likelihood they
would be discoverable upon the argument that they are admissible evidence,
which evidence is unavailable to plaintiff, and/or that they contain certain
information which might lead to relevant evidence. The "work-product"
privilege, therefore, is not an adequate substitute for the attorney-client
privilege.
The impact of the instant case is obvious. The complexity of our legal
system has made it necessary for the individual and especially the corpora-
tion to seek legal advice continuously. Denial of the attorney-client privilege
to the corporate client results in an anomalous situation for it would mean
that businesses which are largely responsible for the economic well-being of
this country, cannot secure legal assistance without fear that their confi-
dential comunications might be disclosed.
EDWARD H. LONDON
24 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1910) .
25 Memorandum for Defendants, pp. 25-31.
26 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1943) (labor union not entitled to privilege against self-
incrimination).
27 Memorandum for Defendants, at 29.8 20
F. Supp. at 776.
29 See note 5 supra.
30 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
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